Journal Report

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination

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Journal Information
Journal Title
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
Publisher
Springer Verlag
ISSN
1860-711X
E-ISSN
1860-7128
Database
SCOPUS
Domain
Physical Sciences, Social Sciences
Classification History
Year A+ A B C
2026 ✓ ✓
2025 ✓ ✓
2024 ✓ ✓
2023 ✓ ✓
2021/2022 ✓ ✓
2020 ✓ ✓
2019 ✓ ✓
2018 ✓
A journal may have more than one classification in the same year. All recorded classifications are displayed.
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Printed: November 12, 2026 03:37